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ABSTRACT
Radio fingerprinting provides a reliable and energy-efficient IoT
authentication strategy by leveraging the unique hardware-level
imperfections imposed on the received wireless signal by the trans-
mitter’s radio circuitry. Most of existing approaches utilize hand-
tailored protocol-specific feature extraction techniques, which can
identify devices operating under a pre-defined wireless protocol
only. Conversely, by mapping inputs onto a very large feature space,
deep learning algorithms can be trained to fingerprint large popu-
lations of devices operating under any wireless standard.
One of the most crucial challenges in radio fingerprinting is
to counteract the action of the wireless channel, which decreases
fingerprinting accuracy significantly by disrupting hardware im-
pairments. On the other hand, due to their sheer size, deep learning
algorithms are hardly re-trainable in real-time. Another aspect that
is yet to be investigated is whether an adversary can successfully
impersonate another device’s fingerprint. To address these key is-
sues, this paper proposes DeepRadioID, a system to optimize the
accuracy of deep-learning-based radio fingerprinting algorithms
without retraining the underlying deep learning model. The key intu-
ition is that through the application of a carefully-optimized digital
finite input response filter (FIR) at the transmitter’s side, we can ap-
ply tiny modifications to the waveform to strengthen its fingerprint
according to the current channel conditions. We mathematically
formulate the Waveform Optimization Problem (WOP) as the prob-
lem of finding, for a given trained neural network, the optimum FIR
to be used by the transmitter to improve its fingerprinting accuracy.
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We extensively evaluate DeepRadioID on a experimental testbed
of 20 nominally-identical software-defined radios, as well as on two
datasets made up by 500 ADS-B devices and by 500 WiFi devices
provided by the DARPA RFMLS program. Experimental results
show that DeepRadioID (i) increases fingerprinting accuracy by
about 35%, 50% and 58% on the three scenarios considered; (ii)
decreases an adversary’s accuracy by about 54% when trying to
imitate other device’s fingerprints by using their filters; (iii) achieves
27% improvement over the state of the art on a 100-device dataset.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Thanks to its unprecedented pervasiveness, one the most crucial
issues in the Internet of Things (IoT) is designing scalable, reliable
and energy-efficient authentication mechanisms [13, 22]. However,
most of the existing authentication mechanisms are not well-suited
to the IoT since they are heavily based on cryptography-based algo-
rithms and protocols, which are often too computational expensive
to be run on tiny, energy-constrained IoT devices [16].
To address this key issue, a number of techniques based on
radio fingerprinting have been proposed over the last few years
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[1, 11, 12, 18–20]. The core intuition behind radio fingerprinting is
that wireless devices usually suffer from small-scale hardware-level
imperfections typically found in off-the-shelf RF circuitry, such
as phase noise, I/Q imbalance, frequency and sampling offset, and
harmonic distortions [9]. We can thus obtain a “fingerprint” of a
wireless device by estimating the RF impairments on the received
waveform and associating them to a given device [21].
Traditional techniques for radio fingerprinting (which are dis-
cussed in details in Section 2) rely on complex feature-extraction
techniques that leverage protocol-specific characteristics (such as
WiFi pilots/training symbols [1, 18] or ZigBee O-QPSK modula-
tion [12]) to extract hardware impairments. Therefore, they are
not general-purpose in nature and are hardly applicable to the IoT,
where a plethora of different wireless protocols are used [23]. To
overcome this limitation, in this paper we use techniques based on
deep learning [8] to design general-purpose, high-performance, and
optimizable radio fingerprinting algorithms. Thanks to the very
large number of parameters (i.e., in the order of 106 or more), deep
neural networks can analyze unprocessed I/Q samples without the
need of application-specific and computational-expensive feature
extraction and selection algorithms [14].
Challenges. There are a number of critical issues in applying
deep learning techniques to RF fingerprinting. First, deep learning
models usually require a significant time to be re-trained, even with
modern GPUs [2]. Therefore, we cannot assume that the underlying
deep learning model can be retrained in real time. Second, a finger-
printing system must evaluate the impact of adversarial actions.
Specifically, to the best of our knowledge, existing work has not yet
evaluated if and when an adversary can imitate a legitimate device’s
fingerprint. Last, but not least, we need to address the (potentially
disruptive) action of the wireless channel on the system’s fingerprin-
ting accuracy. This is because, due to channel action, two identical
waveforms transmitted by the same RF interface at two different
moments in time are usually different from each other. This implies
that the models will operate on non-stationary input data [6], which
significantly decreases the model’s fingerprinting accuracy when
the classifier is used on data collected with a wireless channel that
is significantly different from the one used to train it.
To illustrate this crucial point, Figure 1 shows the confusion
matrices of a deep learning model trained to fingerprint 5 devices
through the experimental testbed that will be presented in Section
6. The confusion matrix (a) was computed on data collected ap-
proximately 5 minutes after the training data was collected, while
Figure 1(b) was obtained by testing the model on completely new
data collected 7 days after the model was trained. Figure 1 remarks
that the fingerprinting accuracy decreases significantly when data
collected under completely different channel conditions is fed to
the model, demonstrating that the channel’s action must indeed be
addressed through real-time optimization.
Novel Contributions. This paper addresses the above chal-
lenges by making the following novel contributions:
•We propose DeepRadioID, a system for real-time channel- and
adversary-resilient optimization of deep-learning-based radio fin-
gerprinting algorithms. The key innovation behind DeepRadioID
is to leverage a carefully-optimized digital finite input response
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Figure 1: Confusion matrices of 5-device bit-similar model
with (a) original dataset; (b) live-collected data. The figure
highlights that different wireless channel conditions imply
a loss in fingerprinting accuracy.
filter (FIR) at the transmitter’s side, which slightly modifies its base-
band signal to compensate for current channel conditions. The
optimal FIR is computed by the receiver and sent back as feedback
to the transmitter. We postulate the Waveform Optimization Prob-
lem (WOP) to find the optimal FIR, and derive a novel algorithm
based on the Nonlinear Conjugate Gradient (NCG) method to effi-
ciently solve it. We show in Section 5 that the FIR’s action can be
effectively compensated at the receiver’s side through the discrete
Fourier transform (DFT) of the received signal, thus causing a neg-
ligible throughput decrease (i.e., less than 0.2% in our experiments).
•We extensively evaluate the performance of DeepRadioID on an
experimental testbed made up of 20 bit-similar devices (i.e., trans-
mitting the same baseband signal through nominally-identical RF
interfaces and antennas). To evaluate the scalability of DeepRadioID
and to experiment with different wireless technologies and deeper
learning models, we also leverage two datasets of IEEE 802.11a/g
(WiFi) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
transmissions, each containing 500 devices. These transmissions
were collected “in the wild” by DARPA for the RFMLS program.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ever to evaluate
radio fingerprinting algorithms on datasets of such dimension. Ex-
perimental results indicate that (i) an adversary trying to imitate
a legitimate device’s fingerprint by using the same FIR filter de-
creases its fingerprinting accuracy by about 54% on the average; (ii)
DeepRadioID increases the fingerprinting accuracy by (a) 35% on
our bit-similar experimental testbed, and (b) by 50% and by 58%
on the 500-device ADS-B and WiFi datasets, respectively; (iii) by
comparing with the state of the art [18], DeepRadioID improves the
accuracy by about 27% on a reduced dataset of 100 WiFi devices.
2 RELATEDWORK
Radio fingerprinting has received significant attention over the last
few years – for an excellent survey paper on the topic, the reader
may refer to [21].
The vast majority of existing work has applied carefully-tailored
feature extraction techniques at the physical layer to fingerprint
wireless devices [1, 11, 12, 18–20]. Nguyen et al. [11] use device-
dependent channel-invariant radio-metrics and propose a non-
parametric Bayesian method to detect the number of devices. How-
ever, the effectiveness of the features is proven with a testbed made
up of only four ZigBee transmitters. Brik et al. [1] considered a
combination of frequency offset, transients, and constellation errors
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to fingerprint 130 IEEE 802.11b cards with an accuracy of 99%. How-
ever, conversely from ours, the experiments in [1] were performed
in an RF-insulated environment (i.e., without any channel effect),
thus the algorithms’ effectiveness in real-world environments has
yet to be established. More recently, Vo et al. [18] proposed a series
of algorithms with features based on frequency offsets, transients
and theWiFi scrambling seed, and validated themwith off-the-shelf
WiFi cards in a non-controlled RF environment, achieving accuracy
between 44 and 50% on 93 devices. In Section 6.4, we show that
DeepRadioID improves the acccuracy of 27% on a 100-device WiFi
testbed. Recently, Peng et al. [12] proposed fingerprinting algo-
rithms for ZigBee devices based on modulation-specific features
such as differential constellation trace figure (DCTF), showing that
their features achieve almost 95% accuracy on a 54-radio testbed.
The key drawback of existing feature-based fingerprinting tech-
niques is that they are inherently tailored for a specific wireless
technology (e.g., WiFi or ZigBee), which ultimately limits their ap-
plicability to IoT scenarios where devices operate under different
standards [23]. Moreover, existingwork on feature-based fingerprin-
ting has not considered the problem of optimizing the algorithm’s
accuracy in real-time. Thus, we consider deep learning to design a
general-purpose and scalable fingerprinting system. Although wa-
termarking has been proposed to identify devices in the IoT [5], it
requires the insertion of additional information, whichDeepRadioID
avoids.
The closest work to ours is [15], where the authors proposed the
usage of convolutional neural networks to fingerprint nominally-
identical USRP X310 devices. They also show that by using ar-
tificially introduced hardware impairments at the transmitter’s
side, the accuracy can be improved to 99%. However, [15] suffers
from the following key limitations: (i) the artificial impairments
cannot be accurately compensated at the receiver’s side; (ii) the
relationship between hardware impairment and accuracy is not
fully characterized; and (iii) adversarial action is not considered.
DeepRadioID overcomes the above limitations by proposing a sys-
tem where we increase in real-time the fingerprinting accuracy
through the application of a FIR filter that (a) is obtained through
rigorous optimization (Section 4.3); (b) can be compensated at the
receiver’s side (Section 5); (c) cannot be used by an adversary to
impersonate another device (Section 6).
3 DeepRadioID: AN OVERVIEW
We first discuss some key observations and motivations to motivate
our design choices in Section 3.1. We then provide an in-depth
description and a walk-through of the main steps involved in the
fingerprinting process in Section 3.2.
3.1 DeepRadioID: Key Intuitions
The need to optimize the accuracy of fingerprinting systems arises
from the fact that the wireless channel is dynamic and almost un-
predictable in nature. Thus, hardware impairments such as I/Q
imbalances, DC offset, phase noise, carrier/sampling offsets, and
power amplifier distortions can be disrupted by the channel’s action.
Moreover, these impairments are also time-varying and dependent
on a number of factors, such as local oscillator (LO) frequency
[17] and current temperature of the RF circuitry [9]. These consid-
erations imply that we cannot assume impairments as perfectly
stationary – hence the need for real-time optimization.
To address the non-stationary nature of the problem, our first
observation is that convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have
shown to be prodigiously suited to recognize complex “patterns” in
input data [10] – these patterns are, in our case, the imperfections
in the radio hardware. However, a major challenge that still lingers
is how do we optimize the CNN’s output for a given device without
retraining the CNN itself. To answer this question, we devise a
new approach based on finite impulse response (FIR) filtering of
the transmitter’s baseband signal to “restore” the patterns that are
disrupted by the current channel conditions – thus making the
signal “more recognizable” to the CNN. We use FIRs because of the
following: (i) FIRs are very easy to implement in both hardware
and software on almost any wireless device; (ii) the computation
complexity of applying a FIR filter of lengthm to a signal is O(m)
– thus it is a very efficient algorithm; and most importantly, (iii)
its effect on the BER can be almost perfectly compensated at the
receiver’s side, as shown in Section 5.
However, this approach spurs another challenge, which is how
to set the FIR taps in such a way that the fingerprinting accuracy for
a given device is maximized. Our intuition here is to find the FIR
that modifies input x so that the resulting x∗ signal maximizes the
neuron activation correspondent to a given device, as shown in
Section 4.3. We are able to do this efficiently since the layers inside
CNNs, although non-linear, are derivable, and thus we can compute
the gradient of the output with respect to the FIR taps according
to a given input. This way, we can design an optimization strategy
that is fundamentally general-purpose in nature.
3.2 DeepRadioID: A Walk-Through
Figure 2 provides a walk-through of the main building blocks of
DeepRadioID and the main operations involved in the fingerprinting
process. We highlight with a shade of blue the blocks that are
added to the normal modulation/demodulation chain as part of
DeepRadioID. The walk-through also shows how an adversary may
try to imitate another device’s fingerprint. The detailed explanation
of DeepRadioID’s main module will be given in Section 4.
The first step for a legitimate device “A" that wants to be au-
thenticated by a receiver “R” is to filter its baseband signal with
FIR ϕA,i−1 (step 1), which was obtained at the previous optimiza-
tion step. FIR ϕA,0 is set to 1 (i.e., no filtering). The filtered signal
is then sent to A’s RF interface (step 2). By also accounting the
effect of the wireless channel, “R" will receive a baseband signal
zAR = xA ⊛ϕA,i−1 ⊛ hAR +wAR, where xA is the transmitted sym-
bol sequence, hAR and wAR are the fading and noise introduced by
the channel, respectively. The I/Q samples of zAR are then fed to a
CNN to fingerprint the originating device (step 4). The fingerprin-
ting result is then used to compensate the FIR filter ϕA,i−1 (step
5, discussed in Section 5), so that the resulting signal is then sent
to the symbol demodulation logic to recover the application’s data
(step 6). The I/Q samples and the fingerprinting result are then fed
to the DeepRadioID FIR Optimization module (step 7, presented in
Section 4). The optimal FIR filter ϕA,i is then sent back to A to
improve its fingerprinting accuracy (step 8).
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Let us define as input a set of N consecutive I/Q samples that
constitute an input to the classifier. Let us also define as slice a
set of S inputs, and as batch a set of B slices. Let us label the D
devices being classified with a label between 1 and D. We model the
classifier as as a function f : X → Y, where X ⊆ CN andY ⊆ RD
represent respectively the spaces of the classifier’s input (i.e., an
example) and output (i.e., a probability distribution over the set ofD
devices). Specifically, the output of the classifier can be represented
as a vector (f1, f2, ..., fD ) ∈ Y, where the i-th component denote
the probability that the input fed to the CNN belongs to device i .
DeepRadioID relies on discrete causal finite impulse response
filters (in short, FIRs) to achieve real-time adaptive waveform mod-
ification. FIRs present several advantages – first, causal filters do
not depend on future inputs, but only on past and present ones.
Second, they can be represented as a weighted and finite term sum,
which allows to accurately predict the output of the FIR for any given
input. More formally, a FIR is described by a finite sequence ϕ of
M filter taps, i.e., ϕ = (ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . ,ϕM ). For any input x ∈ X, the
filtered n-th element xˆ[n] ∈ xˆ can be written as
xˆ[n] =
M−1∑
j=0
ϕ jx[n − j] (1)
Since both wireless channel and hardware impairments operate
in the complex domain by rotating and amplifying/attenuating
the amplitude of the signal, we can manipulate the position in the
complex plane of the transmitted I/Q symbols. By using complex-
valued filter taps, i.e., ϕk ∈ C for all k = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1, we can
rewrite Eq. (1) as follows:
xˆ[n] =
M−1∑
k=0
(ϕRk + jϕIk )(xR [n − k] + jx I [n − k])
= xˆR [n] + jxˆ I [n] (2)
where xRk [n] = Re{xk [n]}, x Ik [n] = Im{xk [n]}, ϕRk = Re{ϕk } and
ϕIk = Im{ϕk }. Eq. (2) clearly shows that it is possible to manipulate
the input sequence by filtering each I/Q sample. For example, to
rotate all I/Q samples by θ = π/4 radiants and halve their amplitude,
we may set ϕ1 = 12 exp
j π4 and ϕk = 0 for all k > 1. Similarly, other
complex manipulations can be obtained by fine-tuning filter taps.
4.2 FIR-based Waveform Modification
Although channel equalization can effectively reduce the effect of
channel distortions on the position of the received I/Q samples, the
algorithms involved are generally not perfect and only partially
counteract phase and amplitude variations caused by the channel.
For this reason, we must devise techniques to dynamically adapt to
rapidly changing channel conditions (e.g., fast-fading/multi-path)
and thus improve the fingerprinting accuracy for a given device.
DeepRadioID leverages FIR filters to maximize the accuracy of
the classifier by dynamically counterbalancing inaccurate channel
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Figure 3: Waveform modification optimization loop.
equalization. Figure 3 shows a block diagram of the waveform mod-
ification optimization loop performed by DeepRadioID. Specifically,
we add a FIR filter before the first CNN layer. This additional layer
uses FIRs to manipulate the input example according to Eq. (2). The
corresponding output sequence is then fed to the CNN.
As shown in Figure 2, let A be the target device for which we
want to improve the detection accuracy of the CNN, and let ϕA,i be
the filter taps associated to the target device at the i-th optimization
step. By using the filtering-based waveform modification on the
input sequence x, the output fA(xˆ) ∈ Y of the classifier with respect
to the filtered sequence xˆ can be written as a function of the filter
taps ϕA,i . Specifically, we have that
fA(xˆ) = fA(x,ϕA, i) (3)
Eq. (3) clearly shows that the accuracy of the classifier depends
on the actual FIR tap vector ϕA,i . Thus, we are interested in de-
vising mechanisms to optimally manipulate ϕA,i such that (i) the
classification accuracy for the target device is maximized (Section
4.3); and (ii) the waveform modification does not negatively impact
the BER of data transmission activities (Section 5). To simplify the
notation, henceforth we will remove the i subscript.
4.3 Waveform Optimization Problem (WOP)
We can now formally define the objective ofDeepRadioID as follows:
(i) maximize the accuracy of the classifier for a specific target device
A; and (ii) to guarantee that the resulting BER does not exceed
a given maximum tolerable threshold BERmax. Since we aim at
achieving channel-resilient waveform modification, we need to
compute a FIR parameter configuration ϕA that can be used for
multiple consecutive transmissions. It is worth mentioning that to
compute different ϕA values for each single input x is inefficient
in many cases. Indeed, the obtained FIR would be effective for the
considered input only, i.e., if applied to another input sequence
x′ , x, the FIR might decrease the accuracy of the classifier. Thus,
maximizing the accuracy with respect to a single input x might
result in poor performance.
To overcome the above problem, rather than maximizing the
accuracy of the classifier on an input-by-input basis, we compute
the the FIR ϕA that maximizes the activation probability fA over a
set of S consecutive inputs, i.e., a slice.
TheWaveform Optimization Problem (WOP) can be then defined
as follows:
maximize
ϕ
1
S
S∑
s=1
fA(xs ,ϕ) (WOP)
subject to BERA(xs,ϕ) ≤ BERmax, ∀s = 1, 2, . . . , S (C1)
where the objective function represents the per-slice average ac-
tivation probability for device A, xs is the s-th input of the slice,
and the BERA(·) represents the BER function corresponding to
transmissions from target node A.
It is worth mentioning that the function fA(xs ,ϕ) represents the
CNN, and thus it outputs the probability that the input I/Q samples
x belong to device A. Thus, by solving the WOP, we compute a FIR
that maximizes the activation probability of the neuron associated
to A.
Problem (WOP) is significantly challenging because (i) the func-
tion fA is CNN-specific and depends from a very high number of
parameters (generally in the order of millions), it is highly non-
linear and to the best of our knowledge, there are no mathemat-
ical closed-form expressions for such a function, even for rela-
tively small CNNs; (ii) the maximum BER constraint (C1) depends
from numerous device-specific parameters (e.g., modulation, coding,
transmission power and SNR) and it is generally non-linear.
Notwithstanding the above challenges, and as we will discuss
in detail in Section 5, the impact of the waveform modification
procedure on the BER of communications among the receiver and
the target device A is negligible. In fact, as shown in Figure 2,
DeepRadioID embeds a FIR Filter Compensation module that uses
peculiar features of FIR filters, e.g., their Fourier transform, to suc-
cessfully reconstruct the original transmitted unfiltered sequence
of I/Q symbols. This compensation procedure effectively removes
any coupling between waveform modification procedures and BER,
i.e., BERA(x,ϕ) ≈ BERA(x). Accordingly, it is possible to relax Con-
straint (C1) by removing it from the optimization problem (WOP).
The relaxed WOP can be formulated as
maximize
ϕ
S∑
s=1
fA(xs ,ϕ) (RWOP)
where we have also omitted the constant term 1/S .
4.3.1 Solving the RWOP. As already mentioned, fA is non-linear
and generally does not possess any useful property in terms of
monotonicity, concavity and existence of a global maximizer. How-
ever, for any input x of the slice, by using back-propagation and
the chain rule of derivatives it is possible to let the CNN compute
the gradient ∇xˆ fA(xˆ) of the classification function fA with respect
to the filtered input sequence xˆ. It is worth noting that ∇xˆ fA(xˆ)
shows how different input sequences affect the accuracy of the clas-
sification function. Nevertheless, we are interested in evaluating
the gradients ∇ϕ f (xˆ) to predict how the accuracy of the classifier
varies as a function of the FIR filtering function. Hence, we need to
extend back-propagation to the waveform modification block.
From Eq. (2), xˆ is a function of ϕ, thus the gradient of fA with
respect to the filter taps ϕ can be computed as
∇ϕ fA(xˆ) = JfA (ϕ)⊤ · ∇xˆ fA(xˆ) (4)
where JfA (ϕ) is the Jacobian matrix of fA(x,ϕ) with respect to ϕ,
⊤ is the transposition operator, and · stands for matrix dot product.
From Eq. (4) and Eq. (2), each element in ∇ϕ fA(xˆ) can be written
as
∂ fA(x,ϕ)
∂ϕZk
=
N∑
n=1
(
∂ fA(x,ϕ)
∂xˆR [n]
∂xˆR [n]
∂ϕZk
+
∂ fA(x,ϕ)
∂xˆ I [n]
∂xˆ I [n]
∂ϕZk
)
(5)
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where k = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1, N is the length of the input sequence
and Z ∈ {R, I }.
By using Eq. (2), ∂xˆ
R [n]
∂ϕZk
and ∂xˆ
I [n]
∂ϕZk
in Eq. (5) are computed as
follows:
∂xˆR [n]
∂ϕRk
=
∂xˆ I [n]
∂ϕIk
= xR [M − 1 + n − k] (6)
∂xˆ I [n]
∂ϕRk
= − ∂xˆ
R [n]
∂ϕIk
= x I [M − 1 + n − k] (7)
The above analysis shows that the relationship between the
waveformmodification and classification processes can be described
by a set of gradients. Most importantly, they can be used to devise
effective optimization algorithms that solve Problem (RWOP).
In Section 4.3.2, we design an algorithm to solve Problem (RWOP)
and compute the optimal FIR filter parameters ϕ by using the Non-
linear Conjugate Gradient (NCG) method and the gradients com-
puted in Eq. (6) and Eq. (7).While our simulation results have shown
that NCG is more accurate than other gradient-based optimization
algorithms (e.g., gradient descent algorithms), we remark that Deep-
RadioID is independent of the actual algorithm used to compute ϕ,
and other approaches can be used to solve Problem (RWOP).
4.3.2 Filter taps computation through NCG. As shown in Figure 2
and discussed in Section 3, DeepRadioID iteratively adapts to chan-
nel fluctuations by periodically updating the filter taps associated
to any given target device A. For the sake of generality, we refer
to this periodic update as an optimization epoch, and a new epoch
is started as soon as one or more triggering events are detected
by DeepRadioID. Triggering events can be either cyclic, e.g., timer
timeout, or occasional, e.g., the accuracy for a target devices falls
below a minimum desired threshold.
For each epoch i , let t = 1, 2, . . . ,T denote the iteration counter
of the optimization algorithm. At each iteration t of the algorithm,
the filter taps are updated according to the following iterative rule
ϕ(t ) = ϕ(t−1) + α (t )p(t) (8)
In Eq. (8), p(t) andα (t ) represent the search direction and update
step of the algorithm, respectively. To put it simple, p(t) gives us
information on the direction to be explored, while α (t ) tells us how
large the exploration step taken in that direction should be. More
in detail, the two terms are computed as follows:
p(t) =
S∑
s=1
(
∇ϕ fA(xs ,ϕ(t−1))
)
+ β (t )p(t−1) (9)
α (t ) = argmax
α
S∑
s=1
fA(xs ,ϕ(t−1) + αp(t)) (10)
where gradients derive from Eq. (6) and Eq. (7), β (1) = 0 andp(0) = 0.
The parameter β (t ) is defined as
β (t ) =
| |∑Ss=1 (∇ϕ fA(xs ,ϕ(t−1))) | |22
| |∑Ss=1 (∇ϕ fA(xs ,ϕ(t−2))) | |22 (11)
and is generally referred to as the conjugate gradient (update) pa-
rameter used in NCG methods to improve the space exploration
process by speeding up the convergence of the algorithm [7].
Interestingly enough, p(1) = ∑Ss=1 (∇ϕ fA(xs ,ϕ(0))) when t = 1.
That is, the first iteration of the NCG algorithm corresponds to a
classic gradient descent. Also, α (t ) in Eq. (10) is computed through
line-search algorithms. While both exact and approximated line
search algorithms can be considered, there are few aspects that
need to be considered when implementing Eq. (10). Indeed, since
the function fA is highly non-linear and has no closed-form repre-
sentation, to compute Eq. (10) requires the continuous evaluation
of
∑S
s=1 fA(xs ,ϕ(t−1) +αp(t)) and its first and second order deriva-
tives. For this reason, in some cases it might be computationally
expensive to run exact line search algorithms on fA, and approxi-
mated line search algorithms are to be preferred. For example, to
speed-up the computation ofα (t ), we can consider a secant method
approximation where the second derivatives of fA are approxi-
mated by using the first order derivatives computed in Eq. (6) and
Eq. (7).
5 DeepRadioID FIR COMPENSATION
Although the waveform filtering process is beneficial to the classifi-
cation process as we can optimally modify the waveform generated
by a given target device, it may negatively affect the quality of
transmitted data. Indeed, moving I/Q symbols within the complex
plane might impact the demodulation and decoding process, thus
increasing the BER associated to the received waveform. Further-
more, the expression of the BER in Constraint (C1) is non-linear and
possesses exact and/or approximated closed-form representations
only in a limited number of cases (e.g., fading channels with known
distributions and low-order modulations).
The above discussion shows that to tackle the BER constraint in
Problem (WOP) is challenging, since we need to devise mechanisms
that are generic enough to be used with any modulation, coding and
channel distributions. To overcome the above issues, we observe
that our waveform modification relies on Eq. (1), which clearly
represents a discrete convolution between the input sequence x
and the filter taps ϕ. For the sake of illustration, in the following
we use the familiar model
z[n] = (h ⊛ xˆ)[n] +w[n] (12)
where each received I/Q symbol z[n] is written as the sum of a noise
termw[n] (typically Additive white Gaussian noise) and the n-th
element of the discrete convolution h ⊛ xˆ between the channel h
and the transmitted filtered sequence xˆ. From Eq. (1), we also have
that xˆ = x ⊛ ϕ. Thus, the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of z and
xˆ can be written as follows:
Z (ω) = H (ω)Xˆ (ω) +W (ω)
= H (ω)X (ω)Φ(ω) +W (ω) (13)
X (ω) = Z (ω) −W (ω)
H (ω)Φ(ω) (14)
where we have used capital letters to indicate DFTs.
Eq. (14) shows that to reconstruct the original unfiltered I/Q
sequence is possible by computing the inverse DFT of each compo-
nent of the received signal. Furthermore, FIR compensation implies
BERA(x,ϕ) = BERA(x). Since, the optimization variable of Problem
(WOP) is ϕ, Constraint (C1) does not depend on ϕ anymore, and
thus it can be removed from Problem (WOP). Finally, note that the
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above FIR compensation method is independent of the underlying
modulation and coding scheme. It means, that FIR compensation
is a general approach, and it can be successfully used to tackle
Constraint (C1).
Despite the above properties, one might argue that in general it
is not possible to compute a perfect estimation ofW (ω) and H (ω).
However, modernwireless networks embed estimationmechanisms
that are almost always able to compute fairly accurate estimations
H˜ (ω) and N˜ (ω), e.g., through training sequences and pilots [17], and
the effect of the FIR filter can thus be compensated to a significant
extent. To validate this crucial assumption, we ran a number of
experiments on our experimental testbed to evaluate the impact
of DeepRadioID’s FIR filtering on the packet error rate (PER) and
throughput (θ ) of a wireless transmission.
(a) ε = 0.0 (b) ε = 0.1 (c) ε = 0.2 (d) ε = 0.5 (e) ε = 1.0
Figure 4: The effect of FIR filtering at the receiver’s side for
different values of ϵ . Top and bottom sides show respectively
the received constellations with/without FIR compensation.
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5
P a
c k
e t
 E
r r o
r  R
a t
e
Epsilon
Packet Error Rate
PER
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5
T h
r o
u g
h p
u t
 ( k
b i t
/ s )
Epsilon
Throughput (kbit/s)
Throughput
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function of ϵ .
Figure 4 shows the received constellations of a QPSK-modulated
WiFi transmission where the payload I/Q samples are multiplied in
the frequency domain (i.e., FIR filtering) with a random I/Q tap with
I ∈ [1− ϵ, 1+ ϵ] andQ ∈ [0− ϵ, 0+ ϵ]). The ϵ parameter represents
the relative magnitude of the filter with respect to no filtering, i.e.,
ϵ = 0. The filtering is then compensated at the receiver’s side by
using Eq. (14).
Due to the imperfection in channel compensation, we notice than
some noise is indeed introduced by the FIR filtering irrespective of
our compensation. However, these imperfections do not translate
in a significant PER increase. Figure 5 shows the PER and θ as a
function of ϵ , which respectively increase and decrease of about
6% and 0.5 kbit/s in the worst case of ϵ = 0.5. However, according
to our experiments in Section 6, the ϵ value is typically below 0.2,
meaning a PER increase <1% and a θ loss <0.2 kbit/s (0.2%).
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we report the results obtained through extensive ex-
perimentation on a practical software-defined radio testbed (Section
6.1), as well as on three datasets of WiFi and ADS-B transmissions
obtained through the DARPA RFMLS program (Section 6.4).
6.1 Radio Testbed Setup
Our experimental testbed is composed by twenty software-defined
USRP radios acting as transmitters and one USRP acting as re-
ceiver. Each USRP has been equipped with a CBX 1200-6000 MHz
daughterboard with 40 MHz instantaneous bandwidth [4] and one
VERT2450 antennas [3]. Therefore, the RF components of each
USRP are nominally-identical. Furthermore, each USRP device sends
the same baseband signal , i.e., an IEEE 802.11a/g (WiFi) frame re-
peated over and over again, to make sure that the deep learning
model is learning the hardware impairments and not data patterns.
Receiver
Transmitters
Figure 6: DeepRadioID Experimental Testbed.
The baseband signal is generated through Gnuradio and then
streamed to the selected SDR for over-the-air wireless transmission.
The receiver SDR samples the incoming signals at 10MS/s sampling
rate at center frequency of 2.432GHz. The collected baseband signal
is then channel-equalized using IEEE 802.11 pilots and training
sequences [17]. Next, the payload I/Q samples are extracted and
partitioned into a sample. In our experiments, we fix the sample
length to 48 · 6 = 288 I/Q values, corresponding to 6 OFDM symbols
containing 48 payload I/Q values. Each of these samples are then
used for training and classification.
6.2 Deep Learning Architecture
We use the CNN architecture reported in [15] and depicted in Figure
7. Specifically, each I/Q input sequence is represented as a two-
dimensional real-valued tensor of size 2 × 288. This is then fed to
the first convolutional layer (ConvLayer), which consists of 50 filters
each of size 1×7. Each filter learns a 7-sample variation in time over
the I or Q dimension separately, to generate 50 distinct feature maps
over the complete input sample. Similarly, the second ConvLayer
has 50 filters each of size 2 × 7. Each ConvLayer is followed by a
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation and a maximum pooling
(MaxPool) layer with filters of size 2 × 2 and stride 1, to perform a
pre-determined non-linear transformation on each element of the
convolved output.
The output of the second convolution layer is then provided
as input to the first fully connected layer, which has 256 neurons.
A second fully connected layer of 80 neurons is added to extract
higher level non-linear combinations of the features extracted from
previous layers, which are finally passed to a classifier layer. To
overcome overfitting, we set the dropout rate to 50% at the dense
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Figure 7: CNN used in our radio testbed experiments.
layers. A softmax classifier is used in the last layer to output the
probabilities of each sample being fed to the CNN.
We use an ℓ2 regularization parameter λ = 0.0001. The weights
of the network are trained using Adam optimizer with a learn-
ing rate of l = 0.0001. We minimize the prediction error through
back-propagation, using categorical cross-entropy as a loss func-
tion computed on the classifier output. We implement our CNN
architecture in Keras running on top of TensorFlow on a system
with 8 NVIDIA Cuda enabled Tesla K80m GPU. To train our CNN,
we constructed a dataset by performing 10 different transmissions
of length 5 minutes for each of the 20 devices, each transmission
spaced approximately 5 minutes in time.
6.2.1 Performance Metrics. Hereafter, we will use the following
two metrics to assess the performance of our learning system:
(1) Per-Slice Accuracy (PSA). As in Section 4.3, a slice is a set of
S consecutive input. The PSA is thus defined as the average
CNN fingerprinting accuracy on the S-sample slice. Since
the FIR filter optimized by DeepRadioID is computed on one
slice, the PSA measures how much DeepRadioID is able to
increase the short-term accuracy of the CNN.
(2) Per-Batch Accuracy (PBA). We define as batch as a set of B
consecutive slices. The PBA is thus defined as the average
CNN fingerprinting accuracy on the B-slice batch. The PBA
measures the impact of the optimal FIR filter on the long-
term accuracy of the CNN.
In the following experiments, we use live-collected data (i.e.,
not coming from the training dataset) to compute the PSA and
PBA. This data was collected 7 days after the data used for training
the dataset was collected. To allow experiments’ repeatability, we
record a transmission from a given device for about one minute.
Then, we select the first slice from the recording and compute the
PSA with no FIR optimization. Next, we perform FIR optimization
on the slice, re-filter each sample in the slice, and compute the PSA
after FIR filtering. To compute the PBA, we apply the same FIR
filter to the B · N − 1 slices collected after the first one and then
compute the average PSA on the B-slice batch.
6.3 DeepRadioID Testbed Results
Figure 8 shows the average PSA and PBA obtained by optimizing
three devices over ten different recordings PSA as a function of
the model size (i.e., 5 to 20 devices). We also show 95% confidence
intervals.
The results obtained in Figure 8 show that DeepRadioID is sig-
nificantly effective in improving the PSA and PBA of our CNN-
based fingerprinting system, which are improved by an average of
about 57% and 35%, respectively. By accounting that the metrics
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Figure 8: PSA and PBA, Experimental Testbed.
are computed on live-collected data and on a testbed of nominally-
identically radios, we consider these results remarkable.
Figure 9 shows the PSA and the PBA obtained by an adversary
trying to imitate another device’s fingerprint by applying the same
FIR. In these experiments, we fixed one device as adversary and
used the FIR from other three devices to compute its PSA and PBA
for each of its ten recordings. Figure 9 shows that by using the
legitimate device’s FIR, the adversary transitions from an average
PSA of 12% to an average PSA of about 6% (50% decrease), corre-
sponding to an average PBA of about 4%. This ultimately confirms
that since a FIR is optimized for a device’s specific channel and
impairments, an adversary cannot use a legitimate device’s FIR to
imitate its fingerprint.
0
0.1
0.2
PSA-NO-FIR PSA-FIR PBA-FIR
Per-Slice and Per-Batch Adversarial Accuracy
 Without and With FIR Spoofing
5 Devices
10 Devices
15 Devices
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Figure 9: Adversarial Action, Experimental Testbed.
6.4 DeepRadioID Dataset Results
To investigate DeepRadioID’s performance on large-scale wireless
systems and with different wireless standards, we consider (i) a
500-device dataset of IEEE 802.11a/g (WiFi) transmissions; and
(ii) a 500-airplane dataset of Automatic Dependent Surveillance
– Broadcast (ADS-B) beacons, both obtained through the DARPA
RFMLS program. ADS-B is a surveillance transmission where an
aircraft determines its position via satellite navigation and period-
ically broadcasts it at center frequency 1.090 GHz with sampling
rate 1 MSPS and pulse position modulation. This makes ADS-B
ideal to evaluate DeepRadioID’s performance on different chan-
nel/modulation scenarios. For both the WiFi and ADS-B datasets,
data collection was performed “in the wild” (i.e., no controlled en-
vironment) with a Tektronix RSA operating at 200 MSPS. For the
WiFi dataset, as in Section 6.3 we demodulated the transmissions
and trained our models on the derived I/Q samples. To demonstrate
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the generality of DeepRadioID, the ADSB model was instead trained
on the unprocessed I/Q samples.
To handle the increased number of devices and experiment with
a different CNN, we use the CNN architecture shown in Figure 10.
In the case of ADS-B we train our CNN on examples containing
1024 consecutive unprocessed I/Q samples. For WiFi, we only use
128 samples. Unless stated otherwise, PSA and PBA are computed
on batches of 12 slices, each containing 25 inputs.
  128,(1x7)
128, (1x5)
(2x128)
WiFi
(2x1024)
ADS-B
  128,(1x7)
128, (1x5)
  128,(1x7)
128, (1x5)
  128,(1x7)
128, (1x5) 256
128
ConvLayerSoftmaxFCMaxPool
Figure 10: CNN used in our dataset experiments.
To compare our approach with the state of the art by Vo et
al. [18], which reports results on 93 devices, we trained our model
on a subset of 100 devices, achieving PSA and PBA of .32 and
.44, respectively. Figure 11 shows the PSA and PBA improvement
brought by DeepRadioID FIR filtering as function of the number of
FIR taps. In particular, the PBA improvement is around 30% when
10 FIR taps are used, which brings the accuracy to about 74% on
the average, outperforming [18] which is 47%.
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Figure 11: PSA/PBA Improvement, WiFi-100.
Figure 12 reports the PSA and PBA improvement on the ADS-B-
500 dataset (baseline PSA and PBA of .5028 and .6193), which reach
respectively about 10% and 50% in the case of 10 filter taps. Figure 12
also shows that, although the ADSB-500 PSA improvement is about
the same experienced in theWiFi-100 model, the PBA improvement
is significantly higher in ADSB-500 (30% vs 50%). This is thanks
to the fact that a very small increase in PSA usually corresponds
to a significant increase in PBA when the number of devices is
higher. Also, ADS-B transmits in a less-crowded channel than WiFi,
thus we expect our model and DeepRadioID to perform better on
ADSB-500 when the number of inputs per slice increases.
This is also confirmed by Figure 13, where we show the PSA
and PBA improvement in the WiFi-500 dataset as a function of
the number of FIR taps and the number of inputs in each slice
(25 and 100). Indeed, Figure 13 shows a similar PBA improvement
when 10 FIR taps are considered. Furthermore, Figure 13 shows
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Figure 12: Per-Slice and Per-Batch Accuracy Improvement,
ADSB-500, as a function of the number of inputs per slice
(100 and 25) and the number of batches (3 and 12).
that the number of inputs per slice significantly impacts on the
fingerprinting accuracy, especially on the PBA, in both ADSB-500
and WiFi-500. This is because (i) the FIR optimization increases in
effectiveness as the number of inputs per slice increases, because
the FIR is averaged over more channel realizations; and (ii) the
boosting effect given by the PBA increases as the number of slices
increases.
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Figure 13: Per-Slice and Per-Batch Accuracy Improvement,
WiFi-500, as a function of the number of inputs per slice (100
and 25) and the number of batches (3 and 12).
Figure 14 shows the PSA improvement for ADSB-500 and WiFi-
500 as a function of the number of FIR taps. As we can see, the
PSA improvement converges to approximately .15 as more FIR taps
are used, in both cases. Very interestingly, Figure 14 also shows
that WiFi-500 converges more rapidly than ADSB-500. This is due
to the fact that our ADSB-500 model was trained on unprocessed
I/Q samples (i.e., without any channel equalization). Therefore, the
number of FIR taps than DeepRadioID needs to obtain the same
performance as in WiFi-500 increases, as the FIR has to compensate
for a significant channel action already mitigated in WiFi-500.
Finally, Figure 15 depicts the average FIR ϵ-value (defined in
Section 5) as a function of the number of taps and the model con-
sidered. As anticipated in Section 5, Figure 15 concludes that the
maximum ϵ-value is below .2, which allows us to achieve low BER
even when the FIR is applied. Interestingly enough, we notice that
ADSB-500 requires taps that are on average higher than WiFi-100
and WiFi-500. This is due to the fact that ADSB-500 operates on
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the FIR has to operate on unprocessed I/Q samples.
unprocessed I/Q samples in the time domain, therefore the taps
required to modify the signal need to be greater.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proposed DeepRadioID, a system to opti-
mize the accuracy of deep-learning-based radio fingerprinting al-
gorithms. We have extensively evaluated DeepRadioID on a experi-
mental testbed of 20 nominally-identical software-defined radios,
as well as on datasets made up by WiFi and ADS-B transmissions.
Experimental results have shown that DeepRadioID (i) increases
fingerprinting accuracy by about 35%, 50% and 58% on the three sce-
narios considered; (ii) decreases an adversary’s accuracy by about
54% when trying to imitate other device’s fingerprints by using
their filters; (iii) achieves 27% improvement over the state of the art
on a 100-device dataset.
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